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Abstract 
[Excerpt] This early warning meeting began the labor and community struggle in Hammond, Indiana to 
save LaSalle Steel, a 350-worker specialty products steel mill owned by Texas-based Quanex Corporation. 
A year later, the plant would expand rather than shut down, the union at LaSalle would be stronger than 
ever, and the labor-community coalition led by the Calumet Project for Industrial Jobs would celebrate its 
biggest anti-shutdown victory yet. 
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For the 
Public Good 
Calumet Project organizes for labor and 
community-based economic development 
• Bruce Nissen and Lynn Feekin 
It all sounded too familiar. As steelworker Dave Martinez sat in 
his union hall one Saturday afternoon listening to the Calumet 
Project staff explain the early warning signs of a possible plant 
shutdown, he mentally checked off what he'd seen at the plant. 
He also thought about having lost another steel job four years 
earlier when LTV closed its Hammond bar mill. Now it looked 
like LaSalle was moving in the same direction. 
The staff person for the Calumet Project for Industrial Jobs 
explained how 40 workplaces in northwest Indiana were now 
under the watchful eye of union leaders who acted as plant 
monitors. The monitors used the early warning "scorecard" 
developed by the Calumet Project to numerically score indications 
of a plant shutdown in the making. They looked at such categories 
as ownership status, disinvestment, sale declines, job loss, mis-
management, quality issues, and production levels. 
Dave scanned the room. Other workers were obviously making 
the connection, too. It was all coming together for them. In early 
1990, the members of the independent Progressive Steelworkers 
Union struck for 30 days over LaSalle's two-tier wage scale and 
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attempt to change pension plans. The strike ended in a com-
promise with few union concessions. Since the summer, however, 
rumors circulated throughout the plant that the heart of the mill— 
the 54-worker turning and grinding department—might be 
relocated. 
This early warning meeting began the labor and community 
struggle in Hammon^, Indiana to save LaSalle Steel, a 350-worker 
specialty products steel mill owned by Texas-based Quanex 
Corporation. A year later, the plant would expand rather than shut 
down, the union at LaSalle would be stronger than ever, and the 
labor-community coalition led by the Calumet Project for Indus-
trial Jobs would celebrate its biggest anti-shutdown victory yet. 
MAKING STEEL AND MAKING TROUBLE 
Spurred on by the early warning workshop, the Progressive 
Steelworkers Union joined with the Calumet Project to defend 
their jobs at LaSalle Steel. Several LaSalle workers had worked 
with Martinez at the LTV bar mill where the attempt to stop a 
shutdown had fallen short. For most members of the PSU, how-
ever, fighting a plant shutdown was totally new territory; its 
leaders and membership were challenged to take risks and expand 
the union's role and its relationship to the community in order 
to win. PSU president Zed Rixie explained, "We had to do some-
thing. If we didn't, the company was going to take our jobs away." 
The union set up three committees to gather information and 
plan strategy: corporate research, workplace, and workforce/ 
community. In setting up these committees, PSU members took 
on activities not ordinarily expected of the rank and file. The cor-
porate research committee gathered extensive information on the 
company's financial condition, the market, and its overall strategic 
plan. The workplace committee mapped out workflow patterns 
in the shop, identified the company's key customers, and evaluated 
space and technology requirements for the operations. The work-
force/community committee surveyed the membership to gather 
demographic information and sources for church and community 
outreach. Although the union questioned the need for this three-
pronged approach in the beginning, as the campaign unfolded 
members saw their efforts paying off. 
Richard Treder, general manager of LaSalle Steel and Quanex 
vice president, had not yet admitted to the relocation of the turn-
ing and grinding department or possible shutdown of the mill. 
Despite union attempts to force an admission, he did not finally 
announce the planned closing until November, giving the union 
LRR FOCUS: Calumet Project for Industrial Jobs 
Born out of the loss of 40,000 jobs in the deindustrialization of 
northwest Indiana in the early '80s, the Calumet Project for 
Industrial Jobs in a non-profit membership organization composed 
of unions, churches, community groups, and inviduals. 
The Calumet Project works on job retention and local economic 
development issues from a labor and community perspective. This 
includes both short term targeted actions (such as fighting an 
announced plant shutdown) and long term policy initiatives (such 
as setting up a regional industrial authority to protect the region's 
economic interests). Equally important, the Project seeks to open 
up the process of economic development to worker and com-
munity voices in the decision-making arena, an arena invariably 
under the exclusive control of business interests and the 
politicians. 
Economic decisions for the region must be guided by one ques-
tion: how does this affect the community and workers in this area? 
The Calumet Project approach channels all organizing toward its 
labor, church and community constituencies and makes sure that 
they shape and work for their own solutions. 
only the 30 days warning required by the contract. 
The union promptly requested involvement in all meetings con-
cerning the proposed relocation and called a press conference 
detailing the threatened job loss. Treder responded angrily, but 
a few days later, backtracked and withdrew the notice, claiming 
to need more time. 
In early December union members and community residents 
organized a public meeting to hear the Hammond mayor and city 
council members, the State Senator, and the local Congressional 
Representative's aide all pledge to support the campaign to save 
jobs. Tom Browne spoke on behalf of Congressman Peter Vis-
closky: "We are not interested in a company whipsawing its 
workers or the community. The Congressman will get in touch 
with Governor Bayh to make sure no state monies are used to 
lure jobs out of Hammond." 
The Calumet Project intervened in two areas not typically 
addressed by job-saving campaigns. First, it urged Hammond 
Mayor Thomas McDermott to avoid a "bidding war" with the 
targeted relocation site in Frankfort, Indiana (110 miles south). 
Second, the Project became an alternate source of information for 
LaSalle's parent company in Texas. It provided Quanex with 
information proving that Treder had submitted misleading quality 
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records to discredit the grinding department. Throughout the cam-
paign, the Project sent Quanex local press coverage and other 
information the corporate headquarters most likely would not 
have received. 
Around the holidays, union activism slacked off. Some union 
leaders feared that a Calumet Project proposal for a "Christmas 
card to Treder with a message" action was "going too far" and 
might backfire. The Project felt the action would keep the initiative 
on their side, but the union had the final say. 
This was in keeping with a basic Calumet Project principle: 
never "go it alone" against the will of the union local. Unilateral 
action by the Project would likely destroy years of building 
credibility with the local labor movement and would violate our 
designated roles: the union as representative of the workers and 
the Calumet Project as a coalition partner and co-strategist. 
Treder might have interpreted the lack of union activity as a 
sign of weakening. In January 1991, he again notified the union 
of a tentative decision to relocate, adding the "short cut" line to 
the list of jobs at risk. He then intimated that if the union took 
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massive concessions—nearly $1 million worth—the relocation 
decision might be reversed. 
In plantwide training sessions attended by over 100 workers, 
the union and Calumet Project developed a six-point strategy to 
combat Treder's plans: (1) reject all concessions; (2) expose glaring 
errors in Treder's figures; (3) develop a counter-analysis with 
available data; (4) call for a feasibility study of how to save the 
jobs in Hammond; (5) request that LaSalle cooperate with the 
feasibility study and postpone a final decision pending its com-
pletion; and (6) continue broad community and media outreach. 
' 'Since we've won this, everything has changed. Management 
has changed; now they're putting big money into the company: 
they're looking for new customers; and labor management relations 
are better. Now we're always watching. And we're ready to act if 
we have to." —Dave Martinez 
Progressive Steelworkers Union 
They carried out the strategy with precision. "I've never seen 
so much of the community pull together like that," exclaimed Rod 
Fields, the union's financial secretary. "The plan was hitting on 
all cylinders.'' During February every significant event converged 
to create a united front of opposition. The media, public officials, 
church, and community leaders all stood with the LaSalle workers. 
First, a major daily newspaper, The Times in Northwest Indiana, 
published an editorial in favor of the "Save LaSalle Jobs" posi-
tion. It rebuked the company for its lack of loyalty to its employees 
and urged the company's cooperation in a feasibility study. 
Second, the Calumet Project disclosed what news stories called 
"a clear betrayal of public trust": LaSalle had received a $97,500 
tax abatement two years earlier for the same "short cut" line it 
now threatened to relocate. From this point on, Treder refused 
to speak to the press. 
Third, the Hammond City Council and mayor responded to com-
munity pressure by writing their counterparts in Frankfort 
requesting that no public subsidies be given to LaSalle. The letters 
pointed out that a bidding war between the two towns would only 
benefit the company. Expressing sympathy with Hammond 
officials, Frankfort Mayor Don Snyder responded favorably in 
his local press: "I can't see us offering incentives for them to 
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come here because I wouldn't want that to happen to any of our 
companies.'' 
These events made the intended relocation extremely difficult 
to accomplish. LaSalle faced opposition and hostility from the 
union, community, and concerned public officials; it received 
unfavorable publicity from the media and no welcoming arms 
from Frankfort officials who questioned the company's motives. 
On March 5, 1991, the company announced through a press 
release that it had reversed its decision. LaSalle's turning and 
grinding department would stay in Hammond. A few months later, 
LaSalle quietly dismissed Treder from his position. The new 
manager has worked hard to establish better relations with the 
union, media, and community. In late 1991, new equipment was 
delivered to the Hammond plant: instead of closing, LaSalle 
expanded and created new jobs. 
The union and Calumet Project won completely. Jobs were 
saved, the entire plant made more secure, and an anti-union plant 
manager was replaced. 
The campaign holds important lessons for other labor/commu-
nity coalitions facing a shutdown. First, no campaign to fight a 
plant closure is fully unsuccessful: lessons are learned about what 
works and doesn't. Rank and filers see the union standing up to 
save their jobs—and are changed forever when they become 
involved. Consciousness is raised about the relations of the 
corporation to its workers and the community. 
The second lesson from the LaSalle campaign is, one campaign 
builds for another. The LaSalle campaign drew on the experiences 
of Dave Martinez and about a dozen other LaSalle workers who 
were veterans of a struggle to save an LTV bar mill four years 
earlier. Not one of them had been leaders in the previous 
"unsuccessful" struggle, but their understanding that it was 
important to resist plant closures proved to be the spark plug for 
the entire effort to save LaSalle. 
Finally, don't wait around for 100% involvement of the union. 
Many leaders and members alike fear going outside the traditional 
function of bargaining and grievance handling to tackle corporate 
research and outreach to the community. Enough committed 
people, willing to take risks, can keep a campaign going to the 
end. At LaSalle, the union and community learned that an early 
warning, a quick intervention, and a united front could reverse 
a shutdown decision and save jobs. 
Fighting shutdowns is not the only way the Calumet Project 
builds labor and community-based economic development. 
Following the LaSalle victory the Project entered a campaign to 
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Taste of Gary petition drive. 
force corporations to pay for the free ride they were receiving on 
tax subsidies. The Calumet Project moved corporate and govern-
ment deals out of the boardrooms and into the streets of northwest 
Indiana. 
FIGHTING THE FEEDING FRENZY AT THE PUBLIC TROUGH 
What's a job creation promise worth? Nothing, when it exists 
only on paper. 
Property tax abatements to businesses are Indiana's favorite 
economic development tool. Yet no credible evidence proves they 
actually create new jobs. In northwest Indiana, almost all plant 
expansions and new plants are granted an abatement, regardless 
of company need or benefit to the community. These abatements, 
which are not subject to oversight or controls, actually shift greater 
tax burdens to homeowners and other businesses. 
In the fall of 1989, the Calumet Project investigated the effec-
tiveness of tax abatements in Hammond. The numbers painted 
a shocking picture: for one year alone, over $15 million in abate-
ments had been granted to 16 companies. As for job creation, 804 
jobs had been promised, but only 74 delivered. 
The Hammond study kicked off a two-year struggle by the 
Calumet Project that won tax abatement laws at the state level 
> 22 Labor Research Review #19 
and in two municipalities. These victories proved that complicated 
tax issues can become the rallying point for a community cam-
paign when people realize that their tax dollars are going to 
corporations with no return of promised jobs. 
In the 1989 Hammond effort, the Calumet Project and a local 
community organization, Interfaith Citizens Organization, 
launched a citizens' campaign to end abatement abuse. The 
campaign called for a city ordinance requiring company finan-
cial information up front, public hearings, and annual reports on 
job creation. In addition, companies failing to create promised jobs 
would be subject to a hearing and possibly a small fine. 
The city's economic development department and the local 
Chamber of Commerce opposed the proposal and effectively 
stalled it for a few months. Labor and community allies countered 
by holding public meetings, canvassing in the neighborhoods, and 
targeting key members of the city council. The grass roots organiz-
ing paid off. After easing the companies' financial disclosure 
requirement, the Hammond City Council passed the ordinance 
and over-rode the mayor's veto in the summer of 1990. 
The Hammond victory was important, but fell short of the 
Calumet Project's ultimate objective: effective sanctions against 
companies abusing public subsidies. The existing state law did not 
allow municipalities to impose any sanctions. Supportive legis-
lators introduced a comprehensive tax abatement bill which 
passed the Indiana House but was refused a committee hearing 
in the Senate. However, the key provision mandating munici-
palities to deny abatements to companies that don't deliver the 
promised jobs was grafted onto another bill which became law. 
The provision has already proven its worth. In November 1991, 
United Airlines agreed to build its maintenance facility in Indiana-
polis, creating 6300 to 7000 jobs. United received incentives from 
the city, county and state totalling nearly $300 million—but 
with a twist. If the airline does not meet the promised job crea-
tion and investment goals, it must rebate the government 
subsidies. City and State, a national publication for the public 
sector, hailed the agreement in an editorial: "If we can't stop the 
incentives wars. . .we at least should know enough to require 
promises in exchange for incentives." 
Having won a major victory at the state level, the Calumet 
Project concluded that a model ordinance could still be won at 
the local level. Organizers set their sights on Gary which also had 
a history of granting tax abatements with little accountability or 
results. "There were a lot of companies that promised a lot of jobs," 
charged Willie Moore, vice-president for both USWA Local 1014 
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and the Calumet Project. "But once they got the money there was 
no way to make them do anything." In the spring of 1991, a coali-
tion of trade union leaders and community activists began to 
formulate an ideal ordinance and organize for its passage. 
The process of organizing for the Gary tax abatement ordinance 
followed the basic principles of the Calumet Project: a partici-
patory process in developing the ordinance; mutual responsibility 
among the coalition partners; and a long-term perspective to build 
the organization through the campaign. 
LRR FOCUS: The Gary Tax Abatement Ordinance 
The Applicant Company must: 
• notify employees (and union if one is present) of its 
intent to apply for an abatement; 
• provide detailed financial information on both the plant 
and any parent company (including sales, profits, net 
assets, capital investments, debts, capacity utilization); 
• list any previous public subsidies received and figures 
on number of jobs promised and delivered; 
• report construction jobs created, permanent jobs gained 
and lost, and changes in job conditions and wages for 
existing employees. 
The City must: 
• deny the abatement unless jobs created are at or above 
the prevailing wage for that job category, (minor excep-
tion for up to two years for business start-ups with fewer 
than 50 employees); 
• deny the abatement unless the applying company provides 
a full health care package to all employees working more 
than 25 hours per week (exemption for up to two years 
for very small employers with less than ten workers); 
• deny abatement for jobs only being relocated; 
• fine the company up to $2500 for falsifying information 
on application or in its reports; 
• terminate the abatement if the recipient company fails to 
create the promised jobs, moves the equipment, or does 
not live up to its commitments. 
) 
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A core group of eight to fifteen people worked steadily on 
formulating the ordinance and mobilizing their constituencies for 
its passage. The law they won provides some of the toughest 
language in the country requiring corporate accountability for 
public subsidies. (See box.) 
Churches and senior citizen networks participated in the cam-
paign. Several churches circulated petitions among their congre-
gants and inserted information on the issue in their church 
bulletins. Senior citizens, many of them retired union members, 
supported the proposed ordinance and a few took on leadership 
roles in the campaign. Union participation was not massive, but 
several union leaders from the Steelworkers and Hospital Workers 
1199 actively supported the drive. 
Lorenzo Crowell, Hospital Workers Union leader, was an active 
member of the team. 'This showed me that citizens working 
together were able to effect changes in the system, primarily by 
relentlessly pursuing their cause and sticking to their convictions,'' 
he declared. "That's what it took to get the politicians to make 
the necessary changes." 
The coalition also reached out to the community. Volunteers 
canvassed two Gary neighborhoods in the petition drive, obtain-
ing hundreds of signatures in support of the proposed ordinance. 
Signatures gathered at Gary's summer festival, the "Taste of Gary," 
gave folks a taste of public and corporate accountability. 
In another outreach effort, two Calumet Project board members 
appeared on a local radio talk show with a wide audience in the 
African-American community. In a city with such long-standing 
high unemployment as Gary, the failure of companies to come 
up with their promised jobs was the critical issue; the shift in the 
tax burden came in second. Listeners responded favorably to the 
proposed ordinance. One person called in to say: "I'm tired of 
paying more taxes so companies can get a break. These companies 
should have to create the jobs, or they don't deserve the tax break." 
By early summer, labor-community organizing had moved most 
of the city council from skepticism or indifference to mild support 
for the ordinance. Two public meetings drew almost 100 people, 
but community pressure induced five city council representatives 
to appear at the second meeting and take a stand on the proposed 
ordinance. It was election year in Gary and public sentiment 
supported the proposed law. The Calumet Project kept up a steady 
flow of tales of past abuse, making it hard for the business com-
munity to publicly lobby against it. 
But what if the business community had gone on the public 
offensive against the tax accountability ordinance? Organizers 
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knew that although the multifaceted outreach garnered over-
whelming public sentiment for the ordinance, the support was 
basically "soft." While citizens enthusiastically signed petitions 
and called radio talk shows, they did not show up en masse at 
community-wide meetings or city council meetings. Could the 
Calumet Project organize people to fill Gary City Hall if need be 
to ensure passage of the ordinance? 
Fortunately, organizers did not have to find out. The Gary City 
Council unanimously adopted, and Mayor Thomas Barnes signed 
the tax abatement ordinance in September 1991. 
But winning is one thing; enforcing is another. Unless the 
Calumet Project and community remain vigilant, the ordinance 
may be neglected or ignored. 
The Calumet Project and its allies organized successfully in three 
different arenas: Hammond, the state of Indiana, and Gary. But 
the real news is not the victories themselves. As Calumet Project 
volunteer Juanita Williams says, "Workers and citizens now 
understand the power of coalition work. We're going to keep the 
pressure on and challenge other unfair policies. That's the only 
way to shake up 'business as usual'." 
FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD 
Economic development and job retention activities in northwest 
Indiana have been altered because of the existence of the Calumet 
Project. To some degree, the terms of the economic debate have 
been changed; public officials can no longer shape economic 
development policy simply with unaccountable subsidies and 
favors to business. Corporations can no longer assume that 
their management decisions will be automatically accepted by 
communities. 
A strong labor-coalition is no accident. Nor is it easy. The 
Calumet Project model offers several lessons—for its limitations 
as well as its accomplishments. The methods that are basic to the 
Calumet Project's approach differ, at times greatly, from those of 
other industrial retention groups. 
First, successful interventions require unions, community orga-
nizations, and churches to expand their self-de fined roles. Unions 
are empowered in entirely new arenas when they monitor their 
workplaces for early warning signs, mobilize their members and 
the community in job-saving campaigns such as the LaSalle Steel 
campaign, or actively participate in coalitions on supposedly 
"community" issues such as tax abatement abuse. 
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I SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF GARY CITIZENS AND THE CALUMET PROJECT 
FOR INDUSTRIAL JOBS TO REQUIRE COMPANIES l/HICH RECEIVE A TAX 
ABATEMENT FROM THE CITY OF GARY TO BE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE CITY 
FOR LIVING UP TO THEIR PROMISES. 
; pay cuts aren't the best way 
;eegivebacks. 
TAX ABATEMENT I^oyalty to its workers. 
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J o b . ** * 
r
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WORTH? 
PS THE UNION DOING 
\VE JOBS AT LASALLE? 
find out - This is an important meeting. 
Union is only as strong as the people! 
Unions which base their activities on an ''organizing model of 
unionism" are more likely to understand the critical role unions 
play in labor-community alliances. For unions already internally 
organizing, early warning and job retention fights are much more 
easily grasped and accepted. 
Labor union support for the Calumet Project is broad, but not 
always deep. Twenty of the 27 member organizations are labor 
unions, but most are only sporadically involved in the Project's 
work. For most unions, its a leap from traditional union priorities 
of bargaining for and servicing members to strategizing and 
mobilizing around job retention and economic development issues. 
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Churches and religious leaders likewise can become a real force 
in shaping the community's economic agenda if they dare to see 
economic justice as part of their spiritual mission. Unlike some 
regions of the country, the church community in northwest 
Indiana does not have a strong history of social activism. Progress 
in developing this leg' of our coalition is slow; only a few churches 
are on board. 
In addition, community organizations play a smaller than 
desired role in Calumet Project activities. Citizen activism is 
sparse, so the area is not particularly fertile ground for network-
ing. In other areas of the country, community organizations play 
far greater roles than they do here. 
A second lesson drawn from the Calumet Project experience 
is that labor-community coalitions function within a context 
dominated by business interests. Northwest Indiana is dominated 
by large worksites owned by Fortune 500 companies. With that 
in mind, the Project selects its goals and specific projects with great 
care. It considers whether a particular campaign will build the 
base or empower its constituencies, and is winnable. In most cases, 
victories are possible only on issues when a clear majority of the 
public finds the corporate-interest argument untenable (such as 
the poor performance of tax abatements),or if the business sector 
itself is divided. 
Third, the economic decision-makers must be susceptible to 
pressure that can be mobilized locally This means that the cor-
poration must be somewhat dependent on the good will of local 
public officials, good relations with the local media, non-antag-
onistic relationships with its workforce, and/or positive relations 
with the community. 
Fourth, coalitions operating at the local level are effective but 
only in a limited arena. They have little immediate influence over 
national public policy or global economic forces. Calumet Project 
victories to save LaSalle Steel jobs or pass the Gary tax abatement 
ordinance were possible only because global economic forces 
allowed room for maneuvering. 
We shouldn't underestimate the value of local struggles, though. 
The opportunity to change national policy will come only when 
enough local actions like these start breaking out around the 
country. 
Finally labor-community coalitions must be willing to be there 
for the long haul. The Calumet Project has been building its base 
since its inception; effective base-building takes years. It may be 
decades before the many small victories and countless efforts add 
up to a really effective coalition. But the effort is necessary. 
* 
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Without a commitment to the long haul, labor-community coali-
tions will remain mostly peripheral organizations with little 
influence. Simply having good ideas or running glitzy media 
campaigns is no substitute for building that influence. 
SETTING OUR SIGHTS O N THE ENVIRONMENT 
The problem and potential of coalition-building will be put to 
the test in one part of the Calumet Project's agenda for the 90's: 
creating an environmental early warning scorecard and network. 
Environmental degradation is a major roadblock to job reten-
tion and renewal in northwest Indiana. The region currently has 
five Superfund sites awaiting clean-up, with more Superfund 
candidates pending. A labor-community approach aimed at sus-
tainable manufacturing, rather than no manufacturing is essential. 
One "Save Jobs" campaign was derailed solely because of 
environmental contamination. After nearly succeeding in reopen-
ing an idled bar mill, the Calumet Project/Steelworkers-led cam-
paign collapsed. Although a new owner had been found who 
agreed to rehire the former workers and recognize the union, the 
sale fell through when an inspector discovered PCBs on the site. 
"I believe the labor movement should become more involved 
in environmental issues because they affect the union directly. 
They affect job retention and the quality of life in the communities. 
Labor has a personal stake in being at the table when environ-
mental policy is made." —Bennie Bailey 
Calumet Project Board Member 
Environmental early warning will be a hard sell. The first and 
most difficult task is convincing workers that pollution is not a 
natural by-product of their jobs and environmentalists are not the 
enemy. Environmentalists, for their part, need to recognize that 
fighting for a cleaner environment is also about better health and 
safety—and job protection—for workers. 
This nascent work in environmental-industrial coalition work 
represents both the difficulties and potential rewards of building 
labor and community coalitions. The false distinction between the 
interests of workers and community members must be erased: 
after all, workers are community members too. The polluted 
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Bennie Bailey meets with Mary Ellen Lloyd, interim chair of the 
FIRR Religion Task Force. 
environment they work in is the same one they come home to 
at the end of their shifts. Citizens who don't work at the plants 
need to understand how the viability of their community depends 
on sustainable manufacturing. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
That early warning workshop two years ago changed Dave 
Martinez's life. It also changed the community. They found that 
individuals working collectively could make a difference. 
The Calumet Project is proud of its accomplishments, but the 
success of an organization cannot be measured by victories alone. 
The long-term impact of the Project will depend on what citizens 
who become involved in our campaigns learn from them—win 
or lose. If our struggles expand the realm of the possible in the 
community's consciousness, then we are succeeding. If each 
member of our coalition grows stronger through their involve-
ment, then we are building for even greater struggles in the future. 
If more unions and community groups in other regions of the 
country commit to building permanent coalitions, then we will 
move closer to ensuring that economic decisions are made not only 
for the corporate good, but for the public good. • 
